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BOOK REVIEWS

ternational law and organization. It is still the skeleton in the
cupboard of every foreign office. And still the orators of the
League of Nations, which has gone far to deprive it of its last
vestiges of substance, pay it lip service. The League is not, they
say, and never can be, a super-state; it is a free association of
sovereign states. There is a terror in the word "super-state" which
makes them close their eyes to the obvious fact that exactly in
the measure in which they contribute to the success and power of
the League they increase its approximation to the "civitas maxima."
It is as though they must at all costs keep up the form of struggle
against a process of biological evolution.
When nationalism revolts, the lawyer is often scapegoat for
the politician. In their devotion to humanity, the representatives
of governments would pledge their principals to unreserved cooperation, if the lawyers had not warned them of the limits set
by that inalienable sovereignty which constitutes the essential mark
of the independent state. Nor can it be denied that they have
some justification in sloughing off the responsibility for caution.
The profession does not leap at new ideas. It had much to do
with the gradual deification of a conception which served its turn
in the break-up of the empire and the abandonment of the temporal
claims of the papacy, and in the mass it remains ignorant of the
desertion of sovereignty by the modern theory of the state. Eventually, however, the discrepancy between the old doctrine and the
facts of present international life must impress itself even upon
the most conservative and practical. As far as the science of law
is concerned, state-sovereignty has been shattered by the unsparing
logic of Krabbe, Duguit, Kelsen, and Verdross. The removal
of what is still, to put it at the lowest, a common mental inhibition
awaits only the realization in practice of a correction in theory.
The Grotius Society has done well in rendering these texts
available to a larger public. Compared with the international political thought and practice of today, they furnish, as I have said,
a striking demonstration of progress. None of the plans, despite
many elements common to them and the covenant, can claim to
be the starting point of a direct development culminating in the
League of Nations, yet they have all influenced the minds of men
in the direction of peace, and it is fitting that those who pointed,
rather hopelessly, a way which humanity has since followed, should
not be forgotten.
From the practical point of view, much has been added to
the usefulness of these small volumes by the introductions. That
of Miss Buckland, in particular, which is prefaced to Kant's "Perpetual Peace," is a brilliant synthesis of the political theories of
the eighteenth century.
PERCY E. CORBETT.
McGill University.
DE L'EsPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATmTA, TiatORIE DITE DE
L'ABus DES DROITS.

de Droit de Lyon.

Par Louis Josserand, Doyen de la Faculte
Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1927. Pp. 426.
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This book is an interesting and valuable study of the place
of the abuse of rights in the legal system. Primarily a study of
French "jurisprudence" (the law laid down in judicial decisions),
it also covers "doctrine" (legal writings or legal science), and
contains sufficient material from foreign codes and statutes to
constitute an essay in comparative law. The author traces the
vitiating effect of abuse in connection with the exercise of ownership, the enforcement of security rights, the recourse to litigation,
the rights within the family, contractual rights, individual and collective liberty, the exercise of public or administrative powers,
and in the operation of private and public international law. Under
each of these heads judicial decisions or legislative acts are presented tending to show an inclination to condition the recognition
of rights upon the legitimacy of the underlying spirit and motive.
This material is made to serve as a basis for a comprehensive theory
of abuse, the abusive act being illicit as distinguished from the illegality of the tort, and also as distinguished from acts of "excess,"
of which the most typical illustrations are found in the law of trade
nuisances.
It is the apparent belief of the author that it is possible to
build on the doctrine of abuse a general theory of a limitation
of rights by enforced subservience to their true social function,
and that there are only a few specific rights emancipated from
this subserviency, which. in a sense constitute anomalies in the legal
system (see s. 306, 307, pp. 389-91); that while apart from these
it is true that the law recognizes self-regarding rights (droits .
esprit 6goiste), this recognition is in itself (in accordance with
Jhering's theory) an instrument of social utility, which is most
effectively advanced by the self-interest of individuals.
A detailed comment upon or criticism of the author's elaboration of his views would require an equally elaborate examination
of the theory of individual rights; but a few general observations
may be offered.
There are large sections of the law which operate entirely
with rights inherently qualified by purposes which they serve.
This is. preeminently true of public law and of administrative
powers, and tinder our doctrine of constitutional law the same may
even be predicated, to an as yet undefined extent, of legislative
powers; it is of course also true of all rights which are in the
nature of trusts. The nineteenth century has witnessed the almost
complete transformation of family rights in Anglo-American law
from self-regarding rights into rights held in trust. The French
law remains more archaic in this respect, and the judicial correction of one of its extreme anomalies-the power of the father
to demand the imprisonment of his child-furnishes Mr. Josserand
with one of his illustrations of the recognition of the doctrine
of abuse; on the other hand our law of breach of promise is
more archaic than the civil law. In all cases in which legal doctrines recognize specifically the elements of good or bad faith,
of malice or of privilege, rights are correspondingly qualified;
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many, if not all, specifically equitable doctrines preclude the abusive
exercise of rights; probably this is also true of the law of easements; under the German Civil Code all contractual obligations
are to be interpreted in accordance with the principle of good
faith. This would not prevent many creditor-rights from being
absolute, and in principle absolute are also the rights of ownership, and many rights of liberty, particularly the right, in the absence of special obligation, to refuse or to terminate relations with
others. The development of the law (e. g., in connection with
air navigation) may specifically limit some of these rights, without otherwise impairing their absolute character. Now it is only
in connection with these absolute rights that the problem of abuse
presents itself as a possible general qualifying principle, and it
presents itself in two forms.
In the first form the problem may best be stated by asking
the question whether section 226 of the German Civil Code should
bq recognized as a general principle of law. This section provides that the exercise of a right is not permitted where the
only purpose of the exercise can be to injure another. In appearance at least this states a principle more definite than section
826, quoted by Josserand as a companion provision, to the effect
that any intentional doing injury to another in a manner contra
botios mores creates an obligation to indemnify-a provision which
permits the elaboration of guiding principles without stating~one.
Section 226 clearly identifies abuse with malice and very properly
outlaws it. But is not the practical value of such a principle so
limited as to be almost negligible? Pure malice does not present
a typical situation in the scheme of human relations, and while
occasionally the problem may present itself, its solution one way
or another is of merely theoretical interest, and would hardly justify
the writing of a book.
A worth-while theory of rights will test them by the reaction of the law to typical situations, and a doctrine of abuse is
sure to be stretched to cover these. Mr. Josserand does this when
he concedes (p. 313) that it would be better to speak of a misdirection (d6tournement) than an abuse of rights. In administrative law we speak of an abuse of discretion whenever discretion
is perverted to other than legal ends. But in practically every
case these extra-legal ends are, in the eyes and in the conscience
of the administrative agent, justifiable and praiseworthy ends;
unfortunately the public policy which he pursues is not that of
the statute from which he derives his power, as the statute is interpreted by the court. So the typically important situations in
which the so-called abuse of rights comes in question are those
in which there is a cash of reciprocally conflicting social, or of
conflicting social- and individual interests.
In the law of public utilities we have witnessed, in the course
of a generation, the transformation of business rights into functions of service, and a few elastic terms give official commissions
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the power to prevent what has been turned into an abuse of property, but what without the statute would be legitimate, even if
"anti-social." The Federal Trade Commission s given power
to forbid unfair methods of competition within the entire scope
of interstate and foreign business. But as the law stands, unfairness involves either fraud or a monopolistic tendency. Conceivably the Commission might be given power to deal with unfair practices in general, and this might give a handle to turn
all business into public service. An industrial commission might
be authorized in similar manner to deal with employment and labor
conditions, a zoning or housing commission with neighborhood
relations and tenancies, and it would not be difficult to imagine
analogous extensions of power into other fields. We have the
administrative technique, and the statutory phraseology; what is
lacking is the preparedness of public opinion to accept such extension of power and such curtailment of private right. Mr.
Josserand quotes the Russian Soviet Code of 1923 as providing
that civil rights are protected by the state except in the cases in
which they are exercised in a sense contrary to their economic
and social purpose. Compare this with s. 226 of the German Code,
and you have the wider and the narrower theory of abuse. It is
the former for which Mr. Josserand stands, but we rnust conclude that while it represents an ideal and possibly a tendency of
development, it does not express any' actual existing theory of
private rights in any of the legal systems with which we are
familiar.
ERNST FREUND.
University of Chicago.
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